The route of the Settle to Carlisle railway was determined primarily by its economic purpose, (a high speed trunk route), and by the five most significant geographical features in a direct line between these two places. Those five physical components are, the valleys of the Rivers Ribble and Eden, the two ‘dry’ valleys formed by 'river capture’ at Ribblehead and Garsdale Head, and the relatively broad and flat watershed at Crooked Rigg, now commonly known as Aisgill. The Eden and Ribble valleys provided the north-south corridor that made the route feasible. The dry valleys provided the link between the Eden and the Ribble. The height of the the watershed determined the overall levels and gradient profiles.

The promoters of the line knew that massive earthworks, extensive tunnelling and large structures would be required. But the expense was justfied given the forecast revenue. And the contractors were not unaware of this. What was not anticipated were geological conditions that affected the building of individual structures such as Dandry Mire Viaduct and the Moorcroft Tunnel. Glaciation enabled the route, but deposits left by the same process forced expensive changes to discrete elements of the project, the risk of which was not priced-in by the contractors.

The first meeting of the Midland Railway’s Settle to Carlisle Construction Committee took place on 6th August 1867. It was resolved that contractors would be invited to tender for the earthworks and major structures, which were split into sections numbered 1 to 4, running north from Settle Junction. By October of the same year tenders had been received, but it was not until April 1870 that the company’s principal engineer Mr Crossley could report that earth had actually been excavated, shafts sunk and interim payments could be certified on the contractors’ accounts. This was because the company had spent two years atttempting to abandon the project after it had obtained Parliament’s consent. Having been given no option but to build, it re-tendered all four contracts at prices well below those agreed with the same contractors two years previously. The reason why the Company insisted upon re-tendering was because it perceived wages had fallen during the intervening two years, which was true. But soon after the contractors re-tendered, the cost of labour rose again, leaving them significantly prejudiced, unless they could persuade the Company to share some of the pain.

The minutes of the Midland’s Construction Committee meetings have a familiar ring to anyone who is used to reading monthly contractor’s reports to the client on modern civil engineering projects. The same excuses for lack of progress, weather issues and related damage, unexpected geological conditions, problems obtaining sufficient labour and plant, all resulting in applications by the contractors for what would now be termed ‘compensation events’ or variations to the contract.

Crisis point was reached in October 1871. Three of the four contractors demanded more money. The Midland rejected these demands out of hand on the grounds that they had knowingly signed fixed price lump sum contracts, and they should have priced the risk. Ashwell, the contractor for Settle Junction to Dent (section 1) immediately threw in the job and walked away, incuring a loss said to be around £100,000 on a contract valued at £350,000. That is a circa £15 million loss in 2022 money. The Company had no option but to complete this section of the works at its own expense employing Ashwell as project manager.

After much unsuccessful pleading, the contractors for sections 2 to 4 decided in the end to stick it out. But money was so tight that the Midland had continuously to advance funds to the contractors against retentions (some at 5% interest) in order to keep them working. The constant lack of cash compounded the problems caused by shortages of labour, in particular tunnel miners.

Almost four years later, on 2nd August 1875, Crossley was pleased to report to the Committee that freight trains had run along the full length of the line. However, a portion of the route was still only single tracked, and a further six months work was required before the Board of Trade inspection could take place in February 1876, following which the line could be opened to passengers.

As regards the three main contracts, all of the contractors expressed themselves dissatisfied with the manner in which they were treated by Crossley. Mr Firbank on Section 3, claimed to have lost £55,000, ‘omitting all consideration of profit’. On Section 2, Benton & Woodiwiss claimed to be owed £113,463, against which Crossley awarded £22,274; and the Company stood by him, refusing to pay any more. Hardly surprising therefore that Benton & Woodiwiss needed a further two years to complete the Hawes branch, ending in another dispute over the final account that the contractor again lost. On Section 4, supposedly the ‘easiest’, Bayliss lost around £30,000.

The Settle to Carlisle line was one of many projects, past and present, that could only be completed with a substantial financial contribution from the contractor’s shareholders.

The purpose of this section is to illustrate some of the more notable construction details that cost so much time and pain.